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On May 20, 2009, President Obama issued a presidential 
memorandum ordering federal agencies to strike preemption 
language from their regulations unless there is "full 
consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and ... 
a sufficient legal basis." 1  The memo was a rebuke to the Bush 
Administration, which regularly inserted preemption provisions 
into federal regulations, affecting areas such as health, consumer 
safety, and the environment. As a result of federal preemption, 
state laws could not be more protective than the federal 
standard, and corporations were spared state tort lawsuits and 
state regulatory regimes. For instance, the EPA preempted the 
states from addressing climate change through limits on motor 
vehicle emissions,2 the FDA decided that its approval of drug 
labels preempted state tort lawsuits,3 and the National Highway 
Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA") issued an 
automotive door lock safety regulation preempting state law.4 In 
each of these instances, the evidence suggests that the White 
House had a hand in making these preemption decisions; they 
were not solely the result of like-minded political appointees 
coincidentally pushing preemption to further business interests.5 
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1. Memorandum on Preemption, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 384, at 1 (May 20, 
2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/ 2009/DCPD- 200900384.pdf. 
2. See infra notes 11 2-119 and accompanying text. 
3 .  Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription 
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 39 22, 3933 -36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 
C. F.R. pts. 201,  314, 601) .  
4. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Door Locks and Door Retention 
Components, Final Rule, 7 2  Fed. Reg. 5385, 5397 (Feb. 6, 2007) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 
571). 
5 .  Regarding FDA preemption, see Alicia Mundy, FDA Memos Undercut Stance 
on Pre-Empting Drug Suits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2008, http://online.ws j. 
com/article/SB1 225 298 21388980687.html ("[T]he administration and White House 
developed a strategy to use regulatory agencies to establish pre-emption.") .  Regarding 
NHTSA, the American Association of Justice, an association of plaintiffs' side trial 
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President Obama rested his memorandum on the values of 
federalism, announcing that " [s]tate and local governments have 
frequently protected health, safety, and the environment more 
aggressively than has the national government. "6 The 
memorandum even reaches back in time; federal agencies must 
review the last ten years of regulations to assess whether the 
rules unjustifiably preempt state authority.7 Not surprisingly, in 
response to the Obama memo, consumer advocates cheered a 
return to the "rule of law . . .  over . . .  the rule of politics,"  while 
business groups warned that companies would have "to navigate 
a confusing, often contradictory patchwork quilt of 50 sets of 
laws and regulations. "8 The Obama memo followed on the heels 
of the Supreme Court's  decisions in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,9 
holding that federal law did not preempt state smoking and 
health lawsuits based on misleading labeling, and Wyeth v. 
Levine, 10 holding that federal law did not preempt state tort 
failure-to-warn lawsuits involving prescription drug labels 
approved by the FD A. Shortly afterwards, the Court ruled in 
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n that federal regulations issued 
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency did not 
preempt state investigations of national bank lending practices. 11 
The preemption winds have shifted. 
President Obama has announced a stand against unjustified 
preemption, and early . indications suggest that the memo is 
impacting the output of federal agencies. For his part, President 
Bush also touted states' rights, for instance, stating before his 
inauguration: "I realize there's a role for the federal 
government, but it's not to impose its will on the states and local 
communities. " 12 However, his Administration's actions belied 
lawyers, issued Freedom of Information Act requests to NHTSA that resulted in a series 
of emails detailing how the Office of Management and Budget, an entity within the 
Executive Office of the President, drafted the preemption language for NHTSA. See 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR JUSTICE, GET OUT OF JAIL FREE: How THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION HELPS CORPORATIONS ESCAPE ACCOUNTABILITY (2008), available at 
http://www. justice.org/resources/Preemption _Rpt. pdf. Regarding climate change, see 
infra notes 112-119 and accompanying text. 
6. Memorandum on Preemption, supra note 1, at 1. 
7. Memorandum on Preemption, supra note 1, at 1. 
8. Philip Rucker, Obama Curtails Bush's Policy of 'Preemption,' WASH. POST, May 
22, 2009, at A3 (quoting the American Association for Justice and Lisa Rickard, President 
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform). 
9. 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) . 
10. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) . 
11. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009) . 
12 . . David Jackson, Bush Seeks GOP Governors' Help; President-Elect Says He Will 
Try To Trim Federal Regulations on States, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 7, 2001, at 4A. 
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this statement. 13 The preemption controversy is part of broader 
debates about the values of federalism and how best to protect 
them. On the one hand, the Tenth Amendment preserves state 
autonomy by limiting federal power to that not reserved to the 
states. On the other hand, the Constitution's Supremacy Clause 
provides that the laws and treaties of the United States "shall be 
the supreme law of the land . . .  anything in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding," and courts 
have placed few limits on Congress' lawmaking powers. Between 
these foundational principles lies the preemption fault line. 
Scholars have tracked preemption trends and disputes closely, 
noting that weemption is currently the "primary threat to state 
autonomy." 4 There is a lively debate as to whether the best 
institutional actor to foster federalism is the courts, Congress, or 
agencies. These scholars ask: who is the best actor to decide 
whether a problem should be tackled at the federal or state level, 
or both? Yet despite the centrality of modern Presidents to 
preemption policy, the role of the President is all but ignored in 
preemption scholarship. 15 
This Article seeks to fill this gap by highlighting the role of 
the President in federalism issues. As this Article makes clear, 
the President can stifle or spur state innovation; foster or imperil 
federal solutions to national problems. Given that federalism 
values are enshrined in our constitutional system of government, 
this Article argues that the President is a key player in ensuring 
those values are fulfilled or undermined. Part I of the Article 
examines official executive branch policies regarding preemption 
and the extent to which those policies have been reflected in 
agency actions. This Part concludes that recent Presidents (from 
Reagan through Obama)16 do not demonstrate a philosophical 
commitment to federalism, but use federalism rhetoric when it 
supports their substantive policy aims. The danger is that states 
13. See Tim Conlan & John Dinan, Federalism, the Bush Administration, and the 
Transformation of American Conservatism, 37 PUBLIUS 279, 280 (2007) (stating that Bush 
was "routine ly dismissive of federalism concerns") . 
14. Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249, 262 (Richard A. Epstein & 
Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) .  
15 .  A notable exception is John 0. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional 
Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 902 (2001) (arguing that presidential federalism orders are 
necessary correctives for declines in federalism and tricameralism wrought by the 
administrative state) . 
16. The Artic le focuses on these Presidents because President Reagan is credited 
with strengthening presidential control over the regulatory state, a trend followed and 
magnif ied by his successors. 
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may be misled into thinking their interests are being considered 
by federal actors, when, in fact, they are not. In turn, this can 
squelch state lobbying and limit opportunities for state 
participation in federal decision-making. Part II responds to the 
literature on institutional competence in federalism decision­
making by placing the President within the debate. While most 
scholars focus on comparing the relative virtues and vices of 
agencies, courts, and Congress, this Part shows how the 
President's  influence affects the attributes of these other actors. 
Part II explains why congressional decision-making about 
preemption is preferable to presidential preemption. However, 
given the reality that Congress often does not or cannot address 
preemption issues ex ante, this Part then examines how the 
President can impact agency decision-making about preemption. 
Part III explores ways in which the President can effectively 
ensure a vibrant role for the states in federalism regimes, while 
also preserving the benefits of centralized government by using 
his Article II powers to direct agencies in a managerial, rather 
than directive, role. 
This Article assumes that a distribution of power between 
the federal and state governments is desirable: the question is 
who decides? A centralized approach, such as that fostered by 
federal preemption, ensures uniformity, lessens compliance 
costs, provides economies of scale, prevents a race to the bottom 
by states seeking to attract businesses , and contains spillover 
effects that arise when activity in one state crosses state lines. 17 
Conversely, state autonomy preserves the states as policymaking 
enclaves, allows the states to serve as laboratories of democracy, 
supports problem-solving that reflects regional differences, 
encourages citizen participation in an accessible level of 
government, diffuses power, and serves as a restraint on federal 
tyranny.1 8 Preemption can limit these state-level benefits.1 9 
Thus, deciding where to draw the line between federal and 
state authority requires a balancing of the benefits and 
17. See Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson , Preemption and Theories of 
Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF 
FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 13, 18-19 (William W. Buzbee ed. , 2009) . 
18. See id. at 16-17. 
19. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken , Uncooperative Federalism, 118 
YALE L.J. 1256, 1304 ( 2009) ("Preemption is  a problem when viewed through the lens of 
uncooperative federalism not because it deprives states of the chance to regulate 
separate and apart from the federal scheme , but because it pushes states to the edges of 
national policymaking and reduces the number of ties that bind state and national 
officials.") . 
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detriments of each sphere. Again, the issue is who draws this 
line. This issue is complicated because regulatory power is not 
neatly carved into separate federal and state layers. Most 
regulatory programs are built upon a cooperative federalism 
framework, where the federal and state governments exercise 
concurrent and overlapping powers.2 ° For instance, in 
environmental laws, Congress typically provides that federal 
standards create a minimum floor, above which states can 
regulate in a more protective manner.21  Likewise, in many public 
benefits programs, federal funds flow to the states within some 
broad parameters, but the states have considerable flexibility in 
program administration, standard setting, and eligibility 
requirements. Sometimes, the relationship between the federal 
and state governments is better described as uncooperative, 
where "states use regulatory power conferred by the federal 
government to tweak, challenge, and even dissent from federal 
law. "22 Preemption shifts all of these paradigms by creating a 
ceiling, or a "unitary federal choice, " above which states may not 
regulate.23 As a result, the "contested questions arise when state 
law seeks to go further than federal law. "24 Given the United 
States' regulatory system of cooperative and competing federal 
and state relations, it is inevitable that presidential control over 
federal agencies will have federalism implications. 
I.  PRESIDENTS AND FEDERALISM 
Typically, Congress legislates with a broad brush and gives 
specialized decision-making authority to executive agencies.25 
There are several reasons for these statutory delegations to 
agencies, ranging from the desire to have experts make 
complicated, technical decisions to an attempt to push politically 
20. See Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: 
THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION, supra note 17, at 
33, 41 ("Since 1937, overlapping state and federal regulation has become the norm, for 
many, if not most, subjects. "). 
21. See William W. Buzbee, The Benefits of Federalism's Institutional Diversity, in 
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE 
QUESTION, supra note 17, at 98, 101 ("Congress has repeatedly chosen to create 
regulatory schemes that call on a role for federal, state, and sometimes even local 
governments.") .  
22. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 19, at  1259. 
23 . Buzbee, supra note 21, at 104. 
24. Young, supra note 14, at 263. 
25. See RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 43-44 
(4th ed. 2004). 
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controversial decisions to the executive branch.26 With increasing 
frequency, modern Presidents have asserted their authority to 
guide agency decision-making, and even to mandate a particular 
agency outcome. In turn, this directive authority can impact 
federal-state relations. This Part discusses what Presidents have 
said about federalism, and then compares their words to their 
actions. In general, recent Presidents regularly talk about the 
importance of power-sharing between federal and state 
governments. However, they will disregard state interests that 
conflict with their substantive policy goals. States can be 
effective in lobbying for their interests with federal actors, but 
only if they have adequate notice that their interests are at stake. 
As this Part describes, presidential rhetoric about federalism can 
mask inattention to state interests. 
A. WHAT PRESIDENTS SAY ABOUT FEDERALISM 
All Presidents since Ronald Reagan have maintained 
official executive branch policies instructing federal agencies to 
consider how their proposed federal actions impact the states. 
Nevertheless, agencies regularly disregard these presidential 
directives.  The federalism executive orders are part of larger 
pattern, emerging since the New Deal, in which Presidents have 
steered and managed the output of federal agencies. During the 
New Deal, President Roosevelt seized increasing control over 
federal regulatory policy, an approach that President Reagan 
revitalized by centralizing and coordinating agency output.2 7 
President Clinton built on this foundation by directing 
administrative agencies to implement his desired policies in lieu 
of legislation.28 Today, "the innovation of 'Presidential 
Government' is triumphant in America. "2 9 President George W. 
Bush inherited and expanded upon these trends, using tools, 
such as signing statements and executive orders, to further his 
conception of the unitary executive,30 in which the President is at 
the apex of the executive branch with the power to direct all 
26. See id. 
27. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277-81 
(2001). 
28. Id. at 2281-84. 
29. David Gray Adler, The Condition of the Presidency: Clinton in Context, in THE 
PRESIDENCY AND THE LAW: THE CLINTON LEGACY 175, 176 (2002). 
30. See Michael P. Allen, George W Bush and the Nature of Executive Authority: The 
Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 871, 872-74 (2007) 
(describing actions taken by President Bush pursuant to broad assertions of executive 
power). 
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subordinate executive officers.31 Like his predecessors, President 
Obama is using executive branch agencies to achieve his policy 
obj ectives. 
President Reagan was the first President to give regulatory 
review teeth, by giving the White House enforcement authority 
over the rulemaking process. Through executive orders,32 he 
required federal agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis as part 
of the rulemaking process, and he centralized review of all 
regulations in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
("OIRA" ), a unit within the Office of Management and Budget 
("OMB " ). These executive orders were partly designed to 
"reduce the flow of bureaucratic power at the national level in 
favor of greater state-level activities."33 Consistent with these 
orders, President Reagan issued E.O. 12,612, which set forth 
nine fundamental principles of federalism to guide agency 
decision-making.34 These principles highlighted the limited scope 
of the national government and the benefits of state sovereignty 
in keeping government close to the people and maintaining 
diverse policy preferences.35 Most significantly, E.O. 12,612 
forbade preemption and displacement of state interests in the 
absence of clear congressional intent.36 
While President Reagan and his successor, President 
George H.W. Bush, used regulatory review to pursue a 
deregulatory agenda, President Clinton used his control over the 
executive branch to achieve his policr objectives without having 
to confront a Republican Congress.3 In E.O.  12,866, President 
Clinton tweaked the Reagan cost-benefit analysis executive 
order by requiring that agencies consider qualitative costs and 
benefits in addition to quantifiable ones, as well as 
"distributional impacts" and "equity," and he expanded 
31. See Christopher S. Yoo, Stephen G. Calabresi, & Anthony J. Colangelo, The 
Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 607 (2005) .  
32. See, e.g . ,  Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981); Exec. Order 
No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 4 1985) .  
33 .  LARRY N. GERSTEN, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 86 
(2007). 
34. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (Oct. 26, 1987). 
35. Id. Additionally, President Reagan required that OMB resolve federal and state 
disputes over federal grants and expenditures in consultation with state officials. Exec. 
Order No. 12,372, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,959 (July 14, 1982). 
36. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 34. Agencies were also required to consult 
with state officials about policies that could displace state authority, prepare federalism 
assessments of the impact of rules on federalism, and appoint officials within each agency 
to ensure compliance with the federalism objectives. Exec. Order No. 12,612, supra note 
34. 
37. See Kagan, supra note 28, at 2248. 
346 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:339 
regulatory review to the independent agencies.38 E.O. 12,866 also 
gave a nod towards federalism; it encouraged federal agencies to 
pursue non-regulatory alternatives and to seek the views of state 
and local officials.3 9 
President Clinton took federalism a step further in 1993, 
when he issued E.O. 12,875 , entitled "Enhancing the 
Intergovernmental Partnership,"  which permitted states seeking 
to avoid federal agency regulations to submit alternative policy 
approaches to federal agencies, who then had to respond to state 
requests within 120 days.40 However, on May 14, 1998, he 
revoked this order, along with President Reagan's federalism 
order, and he issued a new, controversial executive order on 
federalism.4 1 E.O . 13,083 listed nine nonexclusive conditions, 
under which federal agencies could displace state authority.42 For 
instance, E.O. 13,083 permitted federal regulation to preempt 
state authority if the matter involved an interstate concern that 
was not contained within one state's  boundaries , if there was a 
need for uniform standards, or if the federal government had 
superior expertise.43 Unlike the Reagan order, there was no 
presumption in favor of state sovereignty, no provisions limitin� 
preemption, and no requirements for federalism assessments. 4 
State and local governments responded with outrage, the 
National Governor's Association voted in opposition to the 
order, Congress convened hearings, and several congressmen 
introduced bills that would mandate compliance with the 
Reagan federalism order.45 In response, Clinton ended up 
suspending his order, spending over a year consulting with maj or 
organizations representing state and local governments, and 
replacing the order with E.O. 13 ,132, which remains in effect 
today.46 
38. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) .  
39. Id. 
40. Exec. Order No. 12,875, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,093 (Oct. 26, 1993). 
41.  Exec. Order No. 13,083, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,651 (May 19, 1998) .  
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. For a detailed discussion of the differences between the Reagan and Clinton 
orders, see David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, Blueprints for Change, 
Devolution and Subsidiarity in the United States and the European Union, in THE 
FEDERAL VISION 118, 125-31 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) ;  Jennie 
Holman B lake, Note, Presidential Power Grab or Pure State Might? A Modern Debate 
Over Executive Interpretations on Federalism, 2000 BYU L. REV. 293, 308-18 (2000) . 
45. See Blake, supra note 44, at 300-02; see also David S. Broder, Executive Order 
Urged Consulting, but Didn't; State, Local Officials Want Federalism Say, WASH. POST, 
July 16, 1998, at Al5. 
46. See Blake, supra note 44, at 294. 
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E.O. 13,132 is very similar to the Reagan order, although it 
does not require "clear and certain" constitutional authority to 
justify federal action.47 In general, E.O. 13,132 requires an 
agency to identify constitutional and statutory authority before it 
limits the policymaking discretion of the states,  and to consult 
with state officials whenever federal agency action has 
federalism implications.48  The order permits preemption only 
when the statute explicitly permits it, where congressional intent 
is otherwise clear, or where the exercise of state authority is 
inconsistent with statutorily required federal action.49 In any 
event, preemption must "be restricted to the minimum level 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the statute. "50 Moreover, 
agency rules must contain a federalism summary impact 
statement that describes consultation efforts with state and local 
governments and the effect of the regulation on state authority.51 
Finally, agencies must appoint an official to ensure and certify 
agency compliance with the order.52 As with most executive 
orders, E.O.  13,132 has no enforcement mechanism, does not 
cre�te grivate rights of action, and is not subject to judicial 
review. 
President George W. Bush left E.O. 13,132 intact.s4 
Nevertheless, agency officials in his administration regularly and 
aggressively preempted state law as part of a coordinated 
strategy to limit state authority over tort actions.ss This strategy 
was consistent with President Bush's centralization of 
presidential control over the executive branch; for instance, he 
also issued an executive order that placed a presidential 
appointee within each agency who was in charge of developing 
and approving regulations.s6 President Obama inherited these 
executive orders, and the preemption memo is just one of many 
47. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) . 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51 .  Id. 
52. Id. 
53. See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 552 (2005) 
("Contemporary executive orders routinely disclaim any intention to create any right of 
enforcement either against the government or against private individuals.") .  
54. In addition, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum on February 26, 
2001, establishing an interagency working group on federalism, but there is no evidence 
the group ever convened, or that the memo had an impact on any decision-making. See 
Joseph F. Zimmerman, Congressional Preemption During the George W Bush 
Administration, 37 PUBLIUS 432, 436 (2007).  
55.  See THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR 4-5 (2008). 
56. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2703 (Jan. 18, 2007). 
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reversals of President Bush's version of presidential 
administration. 
Even before issuing the memorandum, Obama had 
expressed solicitude for state interests, telling the National 
Governor's Association, in December 2008, that "a single 
courageous state" can "serve as a laboratory experimenting with 
innovative solutions to our economic problems," and promising 
to work with the states together "in partnership. "57 Obama also 
invited the governors to his first state dinner in February 2009, 
stating that his "goal and aim is to make sure that we are making 
life easier, and not harder, for you. "5 8  In the preemption 
memorandum, he committed these principles to writing. Obama 
began by stating that, in recent years, despite E.O. 13,132, 
federal agencies "have sometimes announced that their 
regulations preempt State law . . .  without explicit preemption by 
the Congress or an otherwise sufficient basis under applicable 
legal principles. "5 9 From now on, he announced, preemption will 
occur only with legal justification and consideration of state 
interests.60 The memorandum reminds the executive branch that 
the "citizens of the several States have distinctive circumstances 
and values" that require respect.61 To further these values, the 
memorandum forbids agencies from including preemption 
provisions in regulatory preambles without notice and comment 
(a common tactic under the Bush Administration), permits 
preemption only in accord with E.O.  13 ,132, and requires agency 
heads to review the last ten years worth of regulations containing 
preemption provisions, reassess them, and amend them if 
necessary.62 In short, the memorandum is designed to 
reinvigorate E. 0. 13 ,132. The following Part addresses the 
impact these presidential directives have had on actual policy. 
B. WHAT PRESIDENTS DO ABOUT FEDERALISM 
Presidents regularly speak of respect for state interests, and 
the executive orders exemplify that rhetoric. However, 
presidential actions do not necessarily adhere to these federalism 
57. John Dinan & Shama Gamkhar, The State of American Federalism 2008-2009: 
The Presidential Election, the Economic Downturn, and the Consequences for Federalism, 
39 PUBLIUS 369, 373 (2009) .  
58. Id. 
59. Memorandum on Preemption, supra note 1, at 1 .  
60. Memorandum on Preemption, supra note 1, at 1 .  
61 .  Memorandum on Preemption, supra note 1 ,  a t  1 .  
62. Memorandum on Preemption, supra note 1 ,  a t  1 .  
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statements. Rather, on issues affecting state interests, recent 
Presidents appear driven more by policy objectives than by any 
philosophical commitment to federalism.63 To begin with, 
agencies have rarely complied with the federalism executive 
orders, and Presidents have not enforced those orders .64 This is 
problematic because federal agencies can disregard or remain 
ignorant of state interests, fail to solicit state input, and alienate 
the very state officials who will be tasked with implementing a 
federal statutory scheme. At the same time, this disregard can 
weaken agency analysis of regulatory options and impacts. 
Respect for federalism does not mean that state interests should 
always trump federal interests; rather, it requires fair 
consideration of and deliberation about state interests. Those 
are the stated goals of E.O. 13,132; those goals have never been 
controversial. 
During the Reagan Administration, agencies did not 
implement the federalism executive order and OMB was 
indifferent.65 Subsequently, a 1999 GAO study found that 
agencies had issued 1 1,000 final rules in a two year period 
between 1996 and 1998, but prepared only five federalism impact 
statements.66 Professor Nina Mendelson followed up on the 
GAO study and examined agency output during one quarter of 
2003, finding only six federalism impact analyses in over 600 
proposed and final rulemaking documents.67 Those six analyses 
were of low quality, "failing to analyze state interests in 
providing additional protection for residents, state autonomy, or 
any of the other federalism values. "68 Mendelson also examined 
485 proposed and final rulemaking documents issued in May 
2006.69 Of this group, six rulemakings had a preemptive effect on 
63. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minoritv Poor: 
AccountinR for the Tvrannv of State Maiorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 568-69 (1999) 
("That federalism is often used as a stalking-horse for other substantive ends is at least 
suggested by the lack of consistency among many would-be federalists. Modern 
devolutionists who embrace the traditional defenses of federalism can also be found 
supporting nationalization of tort liability rules in ways explicitly designed to reduce the 
autonomous authority of the states."). 
64. See Lazer & Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note 44, at 131. 
65. See Blake, supra note 44, at 318. 
66. See Federalism: Implementation of Executive Order 12,612 in the Rulemaking 
Process: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong. (1998) 
(statement of L. Nye Stevens, Director, Federal Management and Workforce Issues), 
available at www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99093t.pdf. 
67. Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 695, 719 (2008). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
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state laws, but only three concluded that a federalism impact 
statement was required, and only three indicated a special effort 
by a federal agency to contact affected state agencies for input.70 
Clearly, the executive orders have historically had little effect on 
d 71 agency proce ures. 
At the same time, presidential policy preferences have had 
varying impacts on state autonomy. In general, Republican 
Presidents have been more interested in a deregulatory agenda, 
while Democrats see the executive branch as a tool for 
implementing an activist policy agenda.72 As two federalism 
scholars have explained, "we have frequently encountered 
situations in recent years in which liberals have rushed to defend 
the authority of states to prosecute activist policies, while 
conservatives in Congress and the Bush Administration 
promoted national preemption of activist state laws. "73 Both 
approaches have consequences for federalism and preemption, 
as a comparison between Presidents Clinton and Bush reveals. 
1. President Clinton 
During the Clinton Administration, federal agencies 
generally took a narrow view of preemption and did not seek to 
preempt state common law claims.74 Moreover, despite the heat 
he took over the botched federalism executive order, President 
Clinton is acknowledged to have been generally attentive to the 
interests of states and localities.75 For instance, in 1993, President 
Clinton signed an executive order prohibiting agencies from 
imposing unfunded mandates on the states, and he signed 
codifying legislation into effect two years later.76 In social welfare 
programs, his Administration granted states waivers to 
experiment with programs such as Medicaid and welfare.77 Then, 
70. Id. 
71. See Lazer & Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note 44, at 131 .  
72. See Kagan, supra note 28,  at 2315-16. 
73. Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 293. 
74. See MCGARITY, supra note 55, at 153-54. When states objected to a proposed 
rule by the Federal Railway Administration that would have preempted state common 
law cases against railroads based on a failure to warn at railway crossings, the FRA 
backed down and limited the scope of the preemption. See MCGARITY, supra note 55, at 
153-55. 
75. See Brian E. Bailey, Note, Federalism: An Antidote to Congress's Separation of 
Powers Anxiety and Executive Order 13,083, 75 IND. L.J. 333, 338 (2000). 
76. See id. 
77. See John Kincaid, The State of U.S. Federalism, 2000-2001: Continuity in Crisis, 
31 PUBLIUS 1, 21 (2001) .  Kincaid also notes that waivers have downsides; they can 
"jeopardize the integrity of the rule of law and potentially enhance executive power over 
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over vehement liberal objections, he pushed for and signed 
welfare reform legislation that devolved discretion over welfare 
programs to the state and local levels and encouraged state 
waivers and experimentation.78  
2. President George W. Bush 
Like President Clinton, President Bush had policy 
objectives that he could not get Congress to enact, and he used 
his executive branch toolbox to achieve his ends. For President 
Bush, a prime goal was tort reform,7 9 and he appointed several 
industry lawyers and executives as agency officials in order to 
implement this strategy. Soon, his Administration began to file 
amicus briefs in state tort litigation, arguing that federal law 
preempted state common law claims . 8 ° For instance, the Bush 
Administration argued in legal briefs that ERISA preempted a 
Texas statute (previously signed into law by Bush as governor); 
that EPA-approved pesticide labels preempted state common 
law claims, and that FDA approval of medical devices and drug 
labels preempted state common law claims. 8 1  Agencies then 
began inserting preemption language into regulatory preambles, 
thereby evading notice and comment requirements on the 
preemption issue . 82 This meant that states had no opportunity to 
comment on proposed standards, and were blindsided when 
those standards were announced. Examples of this "preemption 
by preamble" occurred in NHTSA's SUV roof safety standards, 
CPSC's mattress flammability standards, and FDA's drug 
labeling approvals. 83 
Many of these preemption policies were complete reversals 
of prior agency positions and were "largely hidden from public 
view," 8 4 a practice termed "backdoor federalization. " 85 Unlike 
legislative power," and "pose issues of democratic accountability insofar as they are 
negotiated and implemented by executive officials outside of floodlit legislative 
processes." Id. at 22. 
78. See Cashin, supra note 63, at 568-574. 
79. See Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 281-82. 
80. See MCGARITY, supra note 55, at 154. 
81. See MCGARITY, supra note 55, at 154. 
82. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the 
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 228 (2007) . 
83. Id. at 227. 
84. Id. at 252 n.127 (quoting Margaret H. Clune, Stealth Tort Reform: How the Bush 
Administration's Aggressive Use of the Preemption Doctrine Hurts Consumers, CENTER 
FOR PROGRESSIVE REG., Oct. , 2004, http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/ 
preemption. pdf). 
85. Id. at 228. These preambles were accused of "limiting the extent to which 
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President Clinton, who relished the regulatory limelight and 
claimed agency initiatives as his own, President Bush achieved 
his regulatory initiatives with more stealth. Nevertheless, as Jay 
Lefkowitz, Bush's domestic policy advisor, told The Wall Street 
Journal, " [t]he use of rulemaking to protect corporations from 
product liabilit� was discussed from early in the Bush 
administration. " 6 Even in President Bush's last weeks in office, 
the Administration was fast-tracking regulations that would 
preempt product safety lawsuits in a race before the Obama 
Administration took over. 87 The divide between presidential 
rhetoric and agency action meant that states were unable to 
advocate effectively for their interests ; indeed, that was the goal 
of preemption by preamble. 
Overall, President Bush was "routinely dismissive of 
federalism concerns and frequently an agent of centralization," 
in a way that marked a departure from prior Republican 
Presidents . 8 8 Further, although President Bush "never made 
federalism prominent on his agenda, his policies have had 
substantial intergovernmental impacts. " 8 9  For instance, he used 
his executive powers to reform social service delivery, requiring 
federal agencies and states to include faith-based organizations 
in governmental contracting. 90 During his terms in office, states 
were upset at limits on their autonomy imposed by President 
Bush's legislative initiatives, such as: the No Child Left Behind 
Act, standardizing public educational goals; the REAL ID Act, 
mandating state driver's  license requirements; and the Help 
America Vote Act of 2002, imposing national election 
requirements on states. 91 States also chafed at federal budgetary 
reductions in health, education, and welfare programs. 92 Finally, 
intergovernmental relations were strained in the aftermath of 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, as the federal 
information about the process of decision making is available to the public." Holly 
Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1601,  
1632-33 (2008). 
86. Alica Mundy, Bush Rule Changes Could Block Product-Safety Suits, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 15, 2008, at All .  
87. Id. 
88. Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 280. 
89. John Kincaid & Richard L. Cole, Public Opinion on Issues of Federalism in 
2007: A Bush Plus?, 38 PUBLIUS 469, 481 (2008). 
90. See Michele E. Gilman, If at First You Don't Succeed, Sign an Executive Order: 
President Bush and the Expansion of Charitable Choice, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
1103 (2007). 
91. See Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 292. 
92. See Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 283. 
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and state governments struggled to respond to these crises 
without clear parameters for responsibility or accountability. 93 
Thus, despite having identical formal policies regarding 
preemption, the Clinton and Bush Administrations impacted 
state autonomy quite differently. 
3. President Obama 
Obama's preemption memorandum is his formal statement 
on federalism, but of course,  actions speak louder than words. 
Early on, consumer advocates were unhappy when the Obama 
Administration maintained a Bush-era preemption position 
before the Supreme Court in Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n.94 
In Cuomo, the New York Attorney General sent letters to 
several national banks requesting information about their 
lending practices, in order to see whether they violated New 
York's fair lending laws. 95 The Attorney General was 
investigating "why some national banks seemed to be making a 
disproportionate number of high-interest home mortgage loans 
to black and Hispanic borrowers. " 96 The Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") and a banking trade 
association brought suit to enjoin the information request, 
arguing that OCC regulations issued pursuant to the National 
B ank Act preempted state information gathering from national 
banks. 97 Despite the entreaties of consumer and civil rights 
groups, the Obama Administration adopted the Bush 
Administration position that the O CC's preemption decision 
deserved Chevron deference - a position that a sharply divided 
Supreme Court rejected. 9 8 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia 
held that the OCC regulation was an attempt to "exempt 
national banks from all state banking laws,"  in violation of the 
plain language of the statute. 9 9  
Although public interest advocates were disappointed in the 
Obama Administration's position, they chalked it up to a lack of 
time to reverse course (Obama appointee Elena Kagan was 
93. See Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 280-81. 
94. 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009). 
95. Id. at 2714. 
96. John Schwartz, Bank Regulation Case Pits U.S. Against States, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
29, 2009, at B3. 
97. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2714. 
98. See Greg Stohr, Obama Backs Banks; Seek To Block Fair Lending Probe, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601087 &sid=aCdEKiwbiPzQ. 
99. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2720. 
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sworn in as Solicitor General a week before the oral argument) 
and the continued leadership of a Republican appointee at 
OCC. 100 These explanations may indeed have been accurate; the 
Obama Administration has since proposed regulations in-line 
with the goals of consumer and civil rights groups, permitting 
state enforcement of predatory lending laws.10 1  Moreover, the 
Administration has backed away from some prior litigation 
positions. On April 28, 2009, the Department of Justice wrote 
the Third Circuit to withdraw a previously submitted amicus 
brief that argued for preemption of state failure-to-warn claims 
based on drug labeling in Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.102 The case is 
on remand from the Supreme Court for consideration in light of 
the Court's  decision in Wyeth v. Levine.103 
Public interest discontent arose again at the end of 2009, 
when the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
("OIRA"), the executive office within OMB that reviews 
regulations, brought in a conservative economist from the FDA 
on a temporary civil service detail.104 The economist had a history 
of challenging the data behind environmental and public health 
regulations, and while at FDA, he defended federal preemption 
of medical product regulation. 105 Professor Rena Steinzor, 
President of the Center for Progressive Regulation, called the 
personnel decision "discouraging to those hopeful that the 
Obama Administration will fulfill its many commitments to 
revitalize the agencies responsible for protecting public health, 
worker safety, and natural resources. " 10 OMB defended the hire 
as a good fit for a civil service position in an office that was 
"stretched" , and noted that the economist was hired to conduct 
analysis and had "no decision-making role."107 
100. See Stohr, supra note 98. 
101. See Greg Stohr, Banks Must Face State Enforcement, U.S. Court Says, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 29, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=ah4s56vtWoOA. 
102. Letter from Sharon Swingle, Appellate Staff, United States Dep't of Justice, to 
Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk, United.States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Apr. 28, 
2009), available at http://druganddevicelaw.net/DOJ%20Letter.pdf. 
103. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009) (mem. ) .  
104. See OMB Watch, New OIRA Staff Calls Attention to Office's Role, Dec. 8, 2009, 
http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10621; Juliet Eilperin, Official Questions Pollution 
Proposal; OMB Says Views of Economist on Rule are 'Irrelevant,' WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 
2009, at Al5. 
105. See OMB Watch, supra note 104. 
106. Rena Ste inzor ,  Sunstein Watch: Randall  Lutter to OIRA ,  CPR 
B LOG, Dec .  2 ,  200 9 ,  http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog= 
50229EA2-F753-A87A-B78036364E23EAB8. 
107. See Eilperin, supra note 104. 
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Despite these mixed signals, several agencies have issued 
regulations that disavowed preemption positions previously 
taken during the Bush Administration, demonstrating a renewed 
attention to federalism at the agency level. In May 2009, 
NHTSA issued a final rule regarding SUV roof crush resistance 
that deleted preemption language previously contained in the 
Bush-era proposed rule. 10 8  Similarly, in December 2009, NHTSA 
granted a petition for reconsideration of a final rule regarding 
safety standards for vehicle seating and agreed to remove "the 
portion of the regulatory text stating that State tort law 
requirements are preempted" in light of the fact that any 
federal-state conflict was unlikely. 10 9  The agency conducted a 
detailed analysis of preemption and savings provisions in the 
governing statute, as well as in court decisions, and also noted 
that it had "contacted organizations representing interests of 
State and local governments and officials about the rulemaking," 
none of whom had comments on the rule. 110 Likewise, the Mine 
Safety and Health Administration announced in a correction to 
a final rule involving safety for underground trapped miners that 
it had re-analyzed the rule in accordance with the presidential 
memorandum and was rescinding a preamble that purported to 
preempt private tort litigation.111 
The most significant preemption reversal, thus far under 
President Obama, involved EP A's decision to grant California a 
long-sought waiver to regulate motor vehicle emissions. The 
Bush Administration continuously sowed uncertainty over the 
causes and consequences of climate change warming; the result 
was a non-re¥ulatory approach that limited state 
experimentation. 11 To the consternation of the scientific 
community, the White House suppressed and edited portions of 
EPA reports that linked global warming to human activity. 1 3 
108. 74 Fed. Reg. 22,348, 22,349 (May 12, 2009) (codified at 49 C. F.R. pts. 571, 585) 
("We do not foresee any potential State tort requirements that might conflict with 
today's final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption."). In 
its analysis of the comments to the proposed rule, NHTSA noted that it received 
"numerous comments,'' id. at 22,359, on the possible preemptive effect of the rule, 
including one "signed by 27 State Attorneys General and the National Conference of 
State Legislatures," id. at 22,354. 
109. 74 Fed. Reg. 68,185, 68,186 (Dec. 23, 2009) (codified at 49 C. F.R. pt. 571). 
110. Id. at 68,188-89. 
111 .  74 Fed. Reg. 61531 (Nov. 25, 2009) (codified at 30 C. F.R. pts. 7, 75). 
112. See Cinnamon Carlarne, Climate Change- The New "Superwhale" in the Room: 
International Whaling and Climate Change Politics-Too Much in Common?, 80 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 753, 771 (2007). 
1 13. See Jeremy Symons, How Bush and Co. Obscure the Science, WASH. POST, July 
13, 2003, at B4; Andrew C. Revkin & Katharine Q. Seeyle, Report by E.P.A . Leaves out 
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The Bush Administration's position-even in the face of 
"unequivocal" evidence of ¥lobal warming by leading 
international scientific bodies 11 -lead to a battle between 
California and the federal government over motor vehicle 
emissions. By its terms, the Clean Air Act ("CAA") preempts 
state regulation of motor vehicle emissions, but allows California 
to seek a waiver from the EPA if certain statutory requirements 
are met.1 15 If the waiver is granted, other states can adopt 
California's standards, and over the forty year history of the 
CAA, EPA granted many such waivers to deal with local air 
pollution. 116 In July 2002, the California legislature passed a 
statute requiring automakers to reduce vehicular emissions from 
all cars sold in the state, and, in 2005, California sought a waiver 
from EPA to implement the legislation. 1 17 Sixteen states 
subsequently indicated their intent to adopt California's 
standards, 118 but, in December 2007, EPA denied California the 
waiver needed to implement its laws, contending that the state 
law was preempted by the need for uniform federal standards. 11 9  
Frustrated, many states worked to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in other economic sectors. By mid-2007, seventeen 
states had implemented targets for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions through various laws, regulations, and executive 
orders. 12 ° California Governor Schwarzenegger issued an 
Data on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at Al; SETH SHULMAN, 
UNDERMINING SCIENCE: SUPPRESSION AND DISTORTION IN THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 22-24 (2008). 
1 14. See Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Says Global 
Warming ls 'Unequivocal,' N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at Al (noting that the report asserted 
with more than 90% confidence that human-caused greenhouse gases have been the 
major source of global warming in the past 50 years). 
115. See Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and Virtues of Climate 
Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & Clv. RTS. L. REV. 443, 456 (2008). This California-only waiver 
provision was included when the CAA was enacted in 1967 in light of California's severe 
air pollution problems and the state's leading efforts to reduce pollution. See id. at 456. 
1 16. See id. at 456-57. 
1 17. See id. at 454. 
1 18. See Howard A. Learner, Restraining Federal Preemption When There is an 
"Emerging Consensus" of State Environmental Laws and Policies, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 649, 
650 (2008). 
1 19. See Adler, supra note 115, at 457-58. Adler notes that there was "ample 
statutory basis" for the EPA position. Adler, supra note 115, at 458; see also Nina A. 
Mendelson, The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision and Agency Interpretation: 
A Response To Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, 57 DUKE L.J. 2157, 2165-66 (2008) 
(arguing that EPA failed to consider federalism concerns, such as "the value of state 
experimentation given California's history of regulating air pollution"). 
120 See Kevin L. Doran, US. Sub-Federal Climate Change Initiatives: An Irrational 
Means To a Rational End?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 209 (2008) (noting that states have 
acted via several methods, including executive orders, legislation, and press releases); 
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executive order mandating a reduction in the state's greenhouse 
gas emissions,121 while the California legislature passed the 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 through a mix of market 
measures, incentive systems, and direct controls over energy 
producers.122 Twenty-eight states demanded that utilities provide 
a specified percentage of consumer electricity from renewable 
energy sources.123 States also banded together in various regional 
coalitions committed to emission caps on stationary sources of 
air pollution.124 Finally, twelve states and several cities turned to 
the federal judiciary and successfully sued EPA over its failure 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.125 
The lawsuit culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, holding that EPA failed to make a 
reasoned j udgment when it refused to regulate greenhouse 
gases, which the Court held are covered by the CAA.126 Thus, 
states used both their executive and legislative powers, as well as 
the federal judiciary, to overcome the Bush Administration's 
anti-regulatory and pro-preemption climate change policies. 
During his presidential campaign, Senator Obama promised 
that, if elected, he would reverse Bush's environmental policies 
and make the United States a global leader in tackling climate 
change. As President, most of his promised change has come 
through agency regulations, as Congress remains stalled on 
climate change legislation.121 In April 2009, EPA issued an 
endangerment finding that greenhouse gases "threaten the 
public health and welfare of current and future generations; " the 
finding clears the way for substantive regulations.12 8  In May 2009, 
President Obama held a Rose Garden ceremony surrounded by 
the Governors of California and Michigan, as well as auto 
industry executives, in which he announced that EPA and the 
Learner, supra note 118, at 650. 
121. See Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response To Global Climate Change: What 
Role for Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 53 (2007) . 
122. See id. at 55, 58. The states are also suing various industries under a nuisance 
theory. Id. at 91-93. 
123. See Learner, supra note 118, at 650, 652. 
124. See Kaswan, supra note 121, at 58. 
125. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549·u.s. 497 (2007) . 
126. Id. at 528, 533-34. 
127. Steven Mufson & David A. Fahrentold, EPA is Preparing To Regulate Emissions 
in Congress' Stead, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2009, at Al. 
128. 74 Fed. Reg. 66,495, 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 63) ; see 
John M. Broder, E.P.A. Clears Path To Regulate Heat-Trapping Gases for First Time in the 
U.S. , N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at A15. See generally 74 Fed. Reg. 66,495 (Dec. 15, 2009) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 63) (providing the final rule). 
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Department of Transportation ("DOT" ) would commence joint 
rulemaking to set a national fuel economy and greenhouse gas 
standard that would significantly increase mileage requirements 
for cars and trucks. 12 9  The automakers signed on to the effort 
because they preferred a uniform federal standard to various 
levels of state regulation. 130 This is a situation in which both 
industry and environmental advocates favor federal preemption. 
Industry prefers a uniform standard to minimize production 
variations across states, while environmentalists believe that 
climate change is best tackled at national and global levels 
because greenhouse gases are not contained regionally. This 
example shows that preemption is not necessarily harmful to 
state interests; rather, respect for federalism gives states a voice 
in federal decision-making. In June 2009, EPA granted 
California's waiver request, and California agreed to comply 
with a new federal standard. 131 In September 2009, the EPA and 
DOT issued the proposed motor vehicle emissions rules, which 
would constitute the biggest increase in gas mileage standards in 
history.132 With these new proposals , President Obama directed 
executive agencies to take action to protect the climate, but left 
the scientific determinations to agency staff. 
Of course, preemption is only part of the federalism trends 
under the Obama Administration. President Obama took office 
during a time of extreme financial distress. This may drive a shift 
from states as "primary innovators on many policy issues" to 
"renewed attention to federal policy-making," because the 
federal government may be the only actor with the capacity and 
resources to respond to the economic crisis.133 At the same time, 
Obama has been responsive to state fiscal interests through his 
support for federal stimulus funds that flowed to the states for 
programs, such as Medicaid, education, and infrastructure.134 In 
turn, this has resulted in some state backlash. Several Governors 
announced that they would refuse federal stimulus money 
because they feared that unfunded mandates would result when 
129. See Steven Mufson, New Auto Standards vs. Old U.S. Preferences; Mileage Rules 
To Add To Price, Shrink Engines, WASH. POST, May 20, 2009, at Al4. 
130. Id. 
131. 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744 (July 8, 2009). 
132. 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454 (Sept. 28, 2009) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 537, 538) . 
Later that month, EPA moved forward with proposed rules to regulate emissions from 
power plants and industrial facilities. See John M. Broder, E.P.A. Proposes New 
Regulations On Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1 ,  2009, at Al. 
133. Dinan & Gamkhar, supra note 57, at 369; see also Dinan & Gamkhar, supra note 
57, at 378-79. 
134. See Dinan & Gamkhar, supra note 57, at 374-75. 
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the federal funding ended. 135 Nevertheless, these Governors 
either ended up accepting almost all the available funds,  or their 
state legislatures overturned their refusals.136 Similarly, after the 
passage of health care reform, a priority for the President, some 
states banded together to challenge the law's constitutionality. 
These shifting state alliances demonstrate that it is impossible to 
talk about state interests as a monolith. 137 Indeed, it is the states' 
capacity for diverse viewpoints that is one of the supposed 
benefits of federalism. If the federal government ignores or 
squelches this diversity, federal policymaking can suffer as result. 
II. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE 
An extensive body of literature on preemption focuses on 
which institutional actor is best positioned to divide up federal 
and state regulatory authority: Congress, federal agencies, or the 
courts. Congressional supporters stress the political safeguards 
of federalism inherent in the role of states in federal elections. 
Agency advocates argue that rulemaking processes allow states 
to provide input to agencies that is then weighed by the 
regulatory experts in a particular field. The court cohort believes 
only j udges have the competence to take a broad view of how to 
uphold federalism principles. And each camp has strong 
critiques of its competitors: Congress's collective action hurdles 
undermine federalism values; agencies are too specialized to 
understand abstract values of federalism; and courts should 
respect the decisions of the political branches, which have the 
expertise to assess the real-world effects of regulatory programs. 
Regardless of the validity of these competing viewpoints, they 
fail to take into account how the President influences, impacts, 
and compares to each of these actors. 
As Part I shows, Presidents impact the federalism balance, 
sometimes dramatically. Yet, at most, the current debate 
acknowledges that the President is the head of the agencies, thus 
giving the agencies democratic accountability. However, this 
probably assumes too much, as discussed below. This Part puts 
135. See Dinan & Gamkhar, supra note 57, at 375; Shaila Dawan, 6 Governors May 
Reject Portions of Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A12. 
136. See Dinan & Gamhkar, supra note 57, at 375; Mike Stuckey, When Officials 
Reject Stimulus Funds, Sparks Fly; Communities Split Over Attempts To Forgo Recover 
Act Money, MSNBC.COM, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34382454. 
137. See JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: How STATES PROTECT 
THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 22 (2009) (explaining that some state 
interests are universally shared, while others may be categorical or particularistic) . 
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the President in center stage to assess how he compares to 
Congress, agencies, and the courts in protecting federalism. This 
Part aims to help answer the question: what role should 
Presidents play in preemption decisions? This Part concludes 
that it is preferable for Congress, rather than the President, to 
make preemption decisions because Congress is more 
transparent and deliberative than a unitary decision-maker. 
Thus, a presumption against preemption would promote greater 
opportunities for input by states. Still, because agencies make 
most preemption decisions, it is necessary to consider how 
presidential involvement impacts agency processes. The short 
answer is that it depends on the President. 
A. CONGRESS COMPARED TO THE PRESIDENT 
Most commentators promote Congress as the superior 
institutional actor for protecting state interests. 13 8  At the same 
time, there is widespread acknowledgment that Congress 's 
potential is unfulfilled because it often does not expressly 
address whether its statutes greempt state law, or does so in a 
manner that is ambiguous. 1  Thus, many scholars support a 
presumption against preemption, enforced vigorously by courts, 
that would require Congress to speak clearly if it wants to 
preempt state law. In this view, the presumption against 
preemption would foster deliberation by a democratically 
accountable branch, result in carefully considered preemption 
decisions, and comport with primary constitutional principles. 140 
138. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Process-Based Preemption, in PREEMPTION 
CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION, supra 
note 17, at 192, 193 (stating that the presumption can "play a useful role in implementing 
the Constitution's political and procedural safeguards of federalism"); Young, supra note 
14, at 249, 267 ("Constitutionally based limitations should ensure that the power to 
preempt state law remains with Congress.") ; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: 
How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17  
(2007) (" [S]pecific action from Congress on specific legislation can mobilize public 
opinion, thus diminishing the tyranny of the status quo.") .  
139. See Hills, supra note 138, at 9 (" [T]he federal lawmaking process has some 
notorious defects, which prevent it from addressing broad policy issues such as the 
desirability of decentralization."); Sharkey, supra note 82, at 215 ("Congress punts on the 
key question."). 
140. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis With the Net Down: 
Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111 ,  2134 (2008) ("We 
contend that the Constitution requires that the central decision to preempt state law be 
meaningfully traceable to Congress -not simply to the will of the agency itself. This flows 
from the structure of the Constitution.") .  Such a presumption would also put the onus on 
well-financed regulated industries to lobby for and obtain preemption, rather than on 
more diffuse public interest groups that are less capable of organizing to obtain express 
savings clauses. See Hills, supra note 138, at 28. 
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Nevertheless, the reality is that most preemption decisions 
are made by agencies,141 and that the President, as head of the 
executive branch, is directing and/or coordinating some of these 
outcomes. Thus, advocates of the pro-Congress position need to 
articulate why a presumption against preemption would be 
preferable to agency decision-making, particularly with the 
additional layer of presidential involvement. In tum, this 
requires a comparison of congressional and presidential 
incentives to protect state autonomy. If we compare Congress 
and the President along the benchmarks of accountability, 
transparency, and deliberation -"the classic elements of 
representational democracy" 142 -it becomes clear that 
Congress 's main advantages flow from the deliberative and 
transparent nature of its processes, and that, with regard to 
accountability, both of the federal political branches share 
similar incentives where the states are concerned. In the end, 
both Congress and the President fluctuate in their solicitude for 
state interests, usually for reasons tied to substantive policy 
goals. 
1. Accountability 
The pro-Congress position rests on the "political safeguards 
of federalism," a theory set forth by Herbert Wechsler in a 
prominent 1954 law review article where he stated that "the role 
of the states in the composition and selection of the central 
government" preserves state autonomy. 143 Not only are members 
of Congress elected from specific states, but the process of 
lawmaking also provides opportunities for state and local 
governments to assert their interests. 144 W echsler's insights 
reflect our Founders' understandings; they believed in the 
virtues of federalism and established mechanisms to ensure a 
voice for the states in Congress, such as the electoral college 
system for presidential elections and the selection of Senators 
from state legislatures. 145 
141. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency Forcing" 
Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2128 (2009) (" [F)ederal agencies have become the real 
decisionmakers [sic) in preemption controversies.") . 
142. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, 
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1948 (2008). 
143. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CO LUM. L. REV. 543, 558 
(1954) . 
144. See id. at 543-44. 
145. See Clark, supra note 138, at 194-95. 
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Even though most of these structural features no longer 
exist,146 the political safeguards of federalism are arguably 
maintained today by the continued role of states in congressional 
elections, lobbying by organizations that represent state 
interests, the influence of state political party activists on federal 
lawmakers, and Congress's  recognition that the states are 
needed to carry out cooperative federal programs.147 In Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Supreme Court 
explicitly endorsed Wechsler's "political safeguards of 
federalism" theory, stating that "the principal means chosen by 
the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system 
lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. "14 8  
Under this conception of the political landscape, Congress's  
parochial bias stands in contrast to the President's  national 
perspective. As Wechsler described the President, he is "the 
prime organ of a compensating 'national spirit"' who "speaks for 
and represents the full national constituency."14 9 The model of 
the President as a national figurehead supports expansive 
interpretations of executive power, such as unitary executive 
theory and judicial deference to executive branch decisions.150 It 
also suggests that the President's perch might enable him to 
consider federalism benefits that are felt nationally, rather than 
locally, because he can better "register the full intensity of the 
public's preferences" than Congress.151 Indeed, Wechsler 
asserted that the presidential electoral process makes the 
president "responsive to local values that have large support 
within the states. "152 Thus, under the "political safeguards of 
federalism" theory, both political branches have incentives to 
146. Id. at 196 (noting that pursuant to the Seventeenth Amendment, senators are no 
longer appointed by state legislators, states have less control over voter qualifications 
than they had at the Founding, and, in modern practice, presidential electors are selected 
through "winner-take-all popular elections,'' rather than by state legislatures). 
147. See Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 17, at 20-21 (summarizing the political 
safeguards view and its detractors) .  In addition, "the need to win votes from residents of 
states and localities and the willingness to moderate policy positions, in order to do so 
make federal officials less willing to limit state authority during election years." S. 
Nicholson-Crotty, National Election Cycles and the Intermittent Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 38 PUBLIUS 295, 296 (2008). 
148. 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (ruling that Congress has power under the commerce 
clause to extend Fair Labor Standards Act to the state and local governments). 
149. Wechsler, supra note 143, at 552. 
150. See Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial 
Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1219 (2006); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and 
Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1260 (2009). 
151. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 772 
(2004). 
152. Wechsler, supra note 143, at 558. 
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consider state interests, but the President tempers Congress's  
more parochial impulses. 153 
Yet the political safeguards of federalism are disputed, with 
commentators arguing that neither Congress nor the President is 
politically accountable to state interests. For instance, while 
members of Congress have incentives to cater to state and local 
voters, they have nothing to gain from promoting the interests of 
state institutions, which are their "political competitors. "154 Jide 
Nzelibe argues that similar parochial incentives motivate the 
President, who focuses on delivering benefits to battleground 
states, in order to woo enough swing votes to win the electoral 
college. 155 This form of parochialism does not further the values 
of federalism because only a few states get showered with 
attention, which is sporadic at best. These competing theories on 
the political safeguards of federalism suggest a stalemate. At 
times, both political branches have electoral incentives to pay 
attention to issues impacting the states, but neither seems overly 
concerned with preserving federalism as a principled matter. 
Indeed, both the President and Congress know that 
implementing a states ' rights platform is unlikely to gamer votes. 
While public opinion polls show that most voters share a belief 
in a limited national government, 156 they actually end up 
supporting an active role for the federal government when it 
comes to substantive policy areas.157 Moreover, voters are not 
interested in " abstract questions about the division of power. " 158 
Not surprisingly then, politicians like to talk about states' rights, 
but freely take actions inconsistent with those professed beliefs, 
153. Professor John McGinnis adds that because the President's fortunes are 
dependent on economic growth, he has incentives to enforce economic federalism that 
congressional representatives lack because they "seek government action that is 
advantageous for their state, even at the expense of the nation." John 0. McGinnis, 
Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901, 903 (2001) .  
154. Ernest Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46  VILL. L .  REV. 1349, 1358 
(2001); see also Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back Into the Political Safeguards 
of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 958-59 (2001); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics 
Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 CO LUM. L. REV. 215, 293 (2000) . 
155. Nzelibe, supra note 150, at 1248 ("The winner-take-all feature of the electoral 
college shows that it will often be in the president's interests to target benefits at a small 
group of voters at the expense of the rest of the population.") .  
156. See Kincaid & Cole, supra note 89, at 474-75 (stating that, in a 2007 poll, 66.1 
percent of Americans said that "the federal government has too much power today," 
while only 4.7 percent said that state government had too much power). 
157. See Conlan & Dinan, supra note 13, at 296. 
158. Neal Devins, The More Things Change, The More They Stay the Same, 12 
GREEN BAG 137, 137-38 (2009) (explaining why President Bush's conception of 
executive power played no role in the 2008 presidential election). 
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without fear of adverse electoral consequences. Indeed, while 
Congress is often silent about preemption, a bevy of federal laws 
contain preemption provisions, state mandates, and other 
policies that limit state authority, suggesting that states' rights 
are not a consistently overriding value for Congress in passing 
the laws, or for the President in signing them.15 9 Further, due to 
information costs, most voters do not know the particular 
stances taken by their representatives in Congress, while 
incumbents enjoy political advantages that make their stand on 
the merits of specific issues often irrelevant.160 Thus, voters rarely 
punish a congressperson solely for advancing federal interests. 
Likewise, voters do not cast ballots based on how the 
President acts on specific policy issues, such as preemption. 
Rather, they elect someone who they consider like-minded, in 
part, so they do not have to monitor the "quotidian decisions, 
complex judgments, recondite bargains, and other actions" that 
are "beyond their understanding and attention span. " 161 
Moreover, the President makes many decisions that are invisible 
to voters, while White House officials play a role in 
governmental decisions that never get publicly attributed to the 
President. 162 Voters cannot reward or punish the President over 
decisions that are obscured from their view; transparency and 
accountability are linked. In short, both presidential and 
congressional elections are poor mechanisms for voters to 
express their views on specific policy issues, due to the number 
of issues at stake in an election cycle and the limited number of 
candidates.163 As a result, while there are certainly instances in 
which Congress and/or the President are responsive to state 
concerns, it is difficult to conclude that one branch has greater 
political incentives to cater to the states than the other. 
159. See Nicholson-Crotty, supra note 147, at 295; see also Zimmerman, supra note 
54, at 445 ("Congress continually restructures the balance of national-state powers in a 
conceptual vacuum by enacting preemption statutes as ad hoc responses to problems.") ; 
Zimmerman, supra note 54, at 432 (stating that President Bush approved 64 pieces of 
legislation with preemption from 2001 to 2005) . 
160. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1979-80; Stanzewski, supra note 150, 
at 1267. 
161. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2078 (2005) . 
162. See Stanzewski, supra note 150, at 1267. 
163. Stanzewski, supra note 150, at 1270. 
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2. Deliberation and Transparency 
From a state's perspective, deliberation and transparency 
appear to be Congress's  main advantages over the President. To 
begin with, it is far more cumbersome for Congress to act 
because congresspersons have to form coalitions, whereas the 
President can act unilaterally. Congressional lawmaking faces a 
"maze of obstacles,"  as bills must work their way through 
multiple committees, subcommittees, floor votes in the House 
and Senate, and intense negotiations to reach a form agreeable 
in both houses - all the while fending off attacks by party 
leaders, rules committees, filibusters, holds, and other 
procedural roadblocks.164 
Some argue that the slow and infrequent nature of federal 
lawmaking furthers the political safeguards of federalism 
because less legislation makes for less preemption. 165 By contrast, 
William Eskridge contends that this unwieldy process does not 
improve federalism; rather, it leads to "statutory complexity and 
extensive delegation of lawmaking or law-elaborating authority 
to agencies and sometimes courts. " 166 In short, the multiple 
"vetogates" inherent in the lawmaking process result in decisions 
not to decide, with Congress delegating policymaking authority 
h . 167 to t e agencies. 
Once Congress delegates decision-making authority to an 
agency, the President can, and sometimes does, step in to 
influence a preemption decision.168 Yet, from a state's 
perspective, there are more opportunities and more access 
points to provide input to Congress than to the President - as 
long as the states are aware that preemption is on the 
congressional agenda. To be sure,  states can register their 
opinions with the President, but this usually happens after an 
unpopular preemption decision is made. For instance, in the case 
of climate change, many states lashed out at President Bush's 
refusal to regulate by issuing their own activist state-level 
policies, suing the federal government, and keeping the issue 
164. Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral A ction, 
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 146 (1999); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. , Vetogates, 
Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1443-44 (2008). 
165. See Clark, supra note 138, at 329-330. 
166. Eskridge, supra note 164, at 1443. 
167. Eskridge, supra note 164, at 1449. For this reason, Eskridge urges courts to use 
the presumption against preemption to overcome these vetogates. Eskridge, supra note 
164, at 1470-71 .  
· 
168. See supra note 5 .  
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burning in the forefront of public consciousness. 16 9 Similarly, 
when President Clinton issued his preemption executive order 
that appeared unfavorable to the states, they actively and 
successfully organized to change his mind, and he responded. 170 
However, these after-the-fact attacks can be costly to wage, 
undermine stability, and face an uphill battle because it is usually 
harder to dislodge a decision on the back end. (It is also worth 
noting that even the improved Clinton executive order did not 
impact agency decision-making. )  Thus, states are more likely to 
influence the preemption debate if Congress is transparent in 
putting preemption on its agenda than if the President directs 
such an outcome unilaterally. 
Moreover, states can only influence presidential decision­
making if they know about it. While some Presidents promote 
transparency, others obfuscate. The Bush Administration 
generated distrust due to its secrecy. 171 For instance, when 
Congress tried to investigate executive initiatives, the Bush 
Administration consistently resisted congressional efforts to 
subpoena documents about contacts between the White House 
and agencies. 172 As for preemption, agencies began issuing 
regulatory preambles purporting to preempt conflicting state 
law, yet these preambles had never been subject to notice or 
comment, and, in fact, the notices of some proposed rulemakings 
misleadingly suggested that the agency was not considering 
preemption at all, thereby foreclosing comments . 173 Further, due 
to the Bush Administration's  culture of secrecy, it is difficult to 
uncover President Bush's  role in preemption decisions-the 
available evidence comes from leaks, statements made in 
congressional hearings by agency insiders, and responses to 
FOIA requests. 
As a candidate, Obama promised a break from this pattern 
and pledged "to create a transparent and connected 
democracy. " 174 In his first year of office, he issued a stream of 
memoranda and executive orders designed to make the 
executive branch more open to public scrutiny, and to "usher in 
a new era of open Government. " 175 Although such broad 
169. See supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
171. See Cary Coglianese, The Transparency President? The Obama Administration 
and Open Government, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 529 (2009). 
172. See id. at 531. 
173. See Sharkey, supra note 82, at 254. 
174. See Coglianese, supra note 171, at 529. 
175. See Coglianese, supra note 171, at 533 (quoting Memorandum on the Freedom 
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promises may backfire as he sets standards that are nearly 
impossible (or undesirable) to meet, 1 76 Obama has established 
different expectations about transparency and greater 
opportunities for public participation than his predecessor. 
Clearly, the transparency of any given White House varies with 
its holder. 
By contrast, congressional transparency is more consistent 
as an institutional matter, and less susceptible to the winds of 
political will. Congress is "subject to a wider range of pluralist 
voices and interest groups than any other political actor," and, as 
a result, Congress gets better information to inform its decision­
making than does the executive.1 7 7  States can-and do-monitor 
proposed legislation that might usurp their authority, contact 
their representatives to express their views, and rally other 
interest groups in support or opposition to a bill. These are the 
"informal, extraconstitutional" political safeguards of federalism 
that operate today.1 78 State interests are organized into an 
"intergovernmental lobby," consisting of seven main 
organizations of state officials, including the National 
Governors' Association, the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, the National League of Cities, the National 
Association of Counties, the International City-County 
Management Association, the U.S Conference of Mayors, and 
the Council of State Governments.1 79 
Still, while congressional transparency and deliberation 
appear necessary to secure political safeguards of federalism, 
there will inevitably remain situations in which preemption 
decisions will fall to the agencies. Even with the best of 
intentions, Congress legislates ex ante and cannot always foresee 
whether or how its laws may ultimately impact state-level 
initiatives as circumstances change. 180 Moreover, even if a statute 
of Information Act, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 9 (Jan. 21 , 2009), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900009/pdf/DCPD-200900009.pdf) . 
176. Coglianese, supra note 171 ,  at 540. 
177. Nzelibe, supra note 150, at 1222. 
178. NUGENT, supra note 137, at 54. 
179. See NUGENT, supra note 137, at 31, 1 18-120. 
180. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 
727, 754 (2008) ("Congress cannot anticipate when it legislates all the situations in which 
questions of displacement will arise. "); Robert R. Gasaway & Ashley C. Parrish, The 
Problem of Federal Preemption: Toward a Formal Solution, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: 
STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS, supra note 14, at 219, 219 ("Congress cannot 
possibly be expected to anticipate in advance or respond in timely fashion to all 
conceivable ways in which states might attempt to intrude on federal policies."); Gillian 
E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUI<E L.J. 2023, 2081 (2008) 
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addresses preemption, the language can be ambiguous or 
unclear, and agencies then have to decide how to proceed. As a 
result, it is inevitable that agencies will have to make some 
preemption decisions, and that Presidents will, therefore, have 
occasion to direct that process. Accordingly, the next Section 
discusses whether presidential involvement in agency decision­
making enhances or detracts from federalism. 
B. AGENCIES AND PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL 
Although most commentators agree that Congress should 
decide whether or not to preempt state law, the reality is that, 
due to broad congressional delegations, agencies make most 
preemption decisions.181 This raises the question whether the 
President's position as head of the executive branch enhances 
the agency responsiveness to the states,  as supporters of the pro­
agency position assert. Furthermore, at least during the Bush 
Administration, it appears the White House was directing some 
agency outcomes, and, thus, the President's role in preemption 
needs to be considered. Does the President's direct participation 
in agency decision-making further state autonomy such that 
states would benefit from more or less presidential involvement? 
The primary advocates for leaving federalism decisions 
within the hands of agencies are Brian Galle and Mark 
Seidenfeld, who reject the dominant scholarly preference for a 
court-enforced presumption against preemption that would push 
Congress to confront and decide federalism issues in the first 
instance.182 Most scholars are dubious that agencies are suited to 
making federalism decisions because they are staffed by 
unelected bureaucrats and, thus, lack political accountability. By 
contrast, Galle and Seidenfeld claim that this formalist position 
ill-fits the modern regulatory state, in which the Supreme Court 
has already justified deference to statutory interpretation by 
agencies on the grounds of congressional delegation, agency 
expertise, and the superior political accountability of the 
President.183 They contend that agencies perform well on the 
("Congress simply lacks the resources and foresight to resolve all the federalism issues 
that can arise in a given regulatory scheme."). 
181. See Metzger, supra note 180, at 2081 (" [T]he critical comparison is between 
federal agencies and federal courts; given that Congress will delegate broadly.");  Sharkey, 
supra note 141, at 2128 ("[T]he federal agencies have become the real decisionmakers in 
preemption controversies.") .  
182. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1939 (stating that agencies 
outperform the other branches). 
183. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1938 ("[C]laims of congressional 
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benchmarks of deliberation, transparency, and democracy.1 84 Yet 
the Bush-era "preemption war" suggests that these values can be 
undercut when the President steps in and directs substantive 
regulatory outcomes. 
1. Transparency 
As Galle and Seidenfeld assert, agencies are generally 
transparent, which is an important component to good 
governance. Transparency keeps citizens informed about 
government activity, which, in turn, fosters opportunities for 
input and political accountability. Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, agencies must give notice and explanation of 
proposed rules, provide opportunities for public comment, and 
then publish final rules that explain the rule's  basis and pur�ose, 
as well as the agency's  responses to submitted comments. 85 In 
addition, a series of executive orders and federal statutes 
promote transparency by requiring agencies to assess a variety of 
regulatory impacts, such as cost-benefit analysis, effects on small 
business, paperwork burdens, alternatives to unfunded 
mandates, and federalism. 186 Agencies are also subj ect to 
sunshine laws that open agency meetings to the public, 187 and the 
Freedom of Information Act, which gives private persons access 
to government information. 18 8 Moreover, Galle and Seidenfeld 
argue that it is easier for affected parties to access agency staff 
members than to reach congresspersons; the latter are working 
on a wider range of issues and spend the bulk of their time 
focused on constituents. 18 9 
Despite the formal mechanisms set-up to provide agency 
transparency, presidential interference in agency decision­
making can obscure the process. If the President is pulling the 
levers behind the scenes, the public has no way to know who is 
calling the shots and cannot lobby effectively for their interests. 
primacy can be defended, we argue, only on formalist grounds."). 
184. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1939. 
185. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1954-57. 
186. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1957-58. 
187. See Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West 2006) 
(stating that agency meetings headed by collegial bodies must be open to the public) ; 
Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 77-76 (2006) 
(stating that advisory committee meetings and minutes must be open to the public); 
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (2006) (providing that 
government personnel must disclose conflicts of interest) . 
188. 5 u.s.c. § 552 (2006). 
189. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1958-59. 
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Moreover, agency rationales can end up as post hoc 
justifications, rather than legitimate reasoning. We have seen 
that Presidents differ in their own commitments to transparency. 
Whereas President Clinton publicly set agency agendas, and 
then proudly sought to claim agency work as his own, President 
Bush generally remained behind the curtains. President Obama 
is now swinging the pendulum back to greater transparency. 
Given these varied approaches to presidential administration, it 
is hard to conclude that presidential administration fosters 
transparency, as a rule. 
2. Deliberation 
As for deliberation, agencies must provide meaningful 
j ustifications for their rules and to evaluate alternatives.1 90 As the 
Supreme Court stated in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Association, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. , a rule will not survive judicial review if it relies on factors 
outside the statute, fails to consider important aspects of the 
problem, offers an explanation that is contravened by the 
evidence before the agency, or is "so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise. "1 91 Despite the incentives that this "hard look" review 
imposes on agencies to engage in reasoned decision-making, 
commentators disagree over whether agencies are institutionally 
suited to consider federalism values. Galle and Seidenfeld argue 
that agencies are immersed in the programs they administer, 
and, thus, have the expertise to consider the "day-to-day impacts 
that autonomous state regulators would have on a federal 
program,"1 92 and "the extent to which �eographic variations 
warrant different regulatory approaches. "1 9  
Although Professor Nina Mendelson agrees that agencies 
are good at evaluating program impacts, she states that they lack 
the capacity to consider the values of " abstract federalism,"1 94 
i .e. ,  the interest in "preserving state prerogatives for their own 
sake. " 195 As she explains, agencies are specialists in regulatory 
programs, not generalists accustomed to considering federalism 
190. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1939. 
191. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
192. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1972. 
193. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1977. 
194. Mendelson, supra note 151, at 782. 
195. Mendelson, supra note 151 ,  at 781 . 
2010] PRESIDENTS, PREEMPTION, & STA TES 371 
issues that are abstract or political, such as the costs of regulation 
"upon a state's  dignity or a state's function as a policy 
'laboratory' or center of democratic activity."1 96 Further, agency 
staffers are hired for their technical and scientific expertise, not 
because they understand constitutional structure. 197 
The President is in a good position to correct for this agency 
weakness. In one account of the Presidency, the national 
perspective of the President and the electoral process furnish 
incentives for him to look out for state interests, while protecting 
the "national commons from regional selfishness. " 19 8  Moreover, 
the President can lean on the legal expertise within the Office of 
Legal Counsel and the Solicitor General's Office in considering 
abstract questions of federalism. 1 9 9 However, an alternative 
account of the Presidency maintains that the President is far 
more parochial than assumed because he must cater to voters in 
battleground states in order to win re-election and further his 
party's electoral successes.200 As an empirical matter, the conduct 
of recent Presidents suggests that presidential regard for state 
autonomy depends on the substantive policy at stake. Moreover, 
even if the President is better able than agencies to weigh 
abstract federalism values, he does not have the capacity to 
monitor the entire output of the executive branch. Given the 
thousands of agency decisions being made at any time and the 
limited personnel capacity of the White House, the 
Administration's attention to regulatory issues is often 
haphazard, sporadic, and inconsistent.201 
196. Mendelson, supra note 151 ,  at 781. As two commentators have noted, 
" [f]ederalism criteria . . .  do not have a natural home in agencies." Lazer & Mayer­
Schoenberger, supra note 44, at 131 .  
197. See Mendelson, supra note 151,  at  782. Acknowledging that agencies have a 
programmatic focus, several commentators urge courts to make federalism part of hard 
look review; that is, to push agencies to do a better job of considering federalism. See 
Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 142, at 1978; William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look 
Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational 
Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1525 (2009) .  
198. Steven G .  Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 23, 99 (1994) ; see also id. at 35 (describing the electoral process' impact on 
the creation of presidential incentives) .  
199. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in 
Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 682 (2005) (describing these offices as the 
"principal constitutional interpreters for the executive branch"). 
200. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
201. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative 
State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 94-96 
(2006). 
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The President can best impact the bureaucracy's sensitivity 
to federalism by working across the board, rather than 
sporadically and unilaterally. As the head of the executive 
branch, the President can require agencies to do a better job of 
considering state interests. This does not require interference in 
particular agency assessments; rather, the President can use 
regulatory review to ensure that agencies consult with states,  
take state interests into account, and consider viable alternatives. 
This is the model underlying the executive orders, which, if 
enforced, could improve the dialogue surrounding preemption. 
C. COURTS AND THE PRESIDENT 
In 1992, the Supreme Court ruled in Cippollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc. , that a federal statute could preempt state common 
law claims; that case held that FDA-mandated cigarette label 
warnings preempted state tort actions for failure to warn of 
smoking's dangers.202 Cippollone opened the door for regulated 
industries to raise preemption defenses in tort litigation, and 
made the courts increasingly central players in preemption 
decisions. Notably, the Bush Administration pushed preemption 
not only through agency rulemaking proceedings, but also 
through its litigation positions and amicus briefs in support of 
businesses seeking to preempt state tort law. For Presidents, the 
judiciary is one of many tools for advancing a federalism agenda. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court's'  preemption doctrine is a 
muddled one,203 with no "predictable jurisprudential or analytical 
pattern,"204 and this flux provides leeway for the President to 
exert influence over federal preemption. Accordingly, this 
Section considers how presidential politics impact existing 
doctrines of judicial review in the preemption context. 
Given that Congress often fails to speak clearly about 
preemption, and that agencies step in as gap fillers, many 
commentators believe that the federal courts are the onl� 
realistic bulwark against federal intrusions into state interests.2 5 
Scholars have articulated two maj or competing visions for how 
courts should approach preemption decisions. The majority view 
202. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
203. MCGARITY, supra note 55, at 107-08. 
204. Viet Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2085 (2000). 
205. See e.g. , sources cited supra note 137. Congress can also create confusion when it 
enacts both a preemption clause and a savings clause, "which purports not to upend 
existing state common law liability." Catherine Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA 
Preemption of State Products Liability Claims, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 438 (2009) .  
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is that courts should enforce the presumption against 
preemption to compel Congress to wrestle with and resolve 
federalism issues. 
The Supreme Court first articulated the presumption in Rice 
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , stating that it "start[ s] with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not 
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress. "206 In this view, Congress is 
the best institutional actor for making federalism decisions, but 
the courts need to push Congress to do its job. As noted earlier, 
congressional decision-making is said to foster deliberation, 
create opportunities for state input, comply with constitutional 
lawmaking requirements, and put the onus on regulated 
industries to lobby for and obtain favorable preemption 
• • 201 M h d f prov1s10ns. oreover, too muc e erence to agency 
preemption decisions is dangerous because agencies can 
completely subsume a regulatory field, leaving the "sole 
enforcement mechanism of a regulatory regime entirely 
concentrated within a single, overworked "20 8 agency, and 
substituting "public for private enforcement of the law. "20 9 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court enforces the presumption 
against preemption rarely and inconsistently.210 
Accordingly, another group of scholars argue that courts 
should (and sometimes do) use administrative law doctrine, such 
as hard look review, to ensure that agencies adequately consider 
state interests. For instance, Catherine Sharkey would have 
courts "look to the regulatory record to determine whether or 
not an agency actually considered the risks that the state law 
attempts to protect against, " rather than the agency's formal 
206. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) .  
207. Detractors argue that the presumption can disrupt the "constitutional division 
of power between federal and state governments,'' Dinh, supra note 204, at 2092, and 
permit courts to engage in "under the table constitutional lawmaking,'' that tilts the field 
away from preemption, even when preemption is warranted, Verchick & Mendelson, 
supra note 17, at 23 (quoting William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi­
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
593, 635 (1992)).  
208. Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in 
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE 
QUESTION, supra note 17, at 119, 141.  
209. Sharkey, supra note 82, at 248. 
210. See Sharkey, supra note 205, at 439; Hills, supra note 138, at 60 (stating that the 
Court has "frequently honored" the presumption by "abandoning it, finding an intent to 
preempt even without anything remotely like 'clear and manifest' evidence of such 
intent") . 
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statements about preemption.2 11 Gillian Metzger highlights how 
administrative law operates as a check on agency capture, 
politicization, and self-aggrandizement,2 12 while simultaneously 
giving states opportunities for notice and participation when 
their interests are at stake. These agency-first approaches would 
arguably minimize judicial interference with congressional 
prerogatives, allow regulatory experts to assess the impact of 
federal programs on the states, and give agencies incentives to 
consider state interests. 
Thus, the main debate is whether the courts should push 
Congress or agencies to better consider federalism. 2 13 If courts 
vigorously enforced the presumption against preemption, 
agencies would not be able to preempt without express 
congressional permission. As a result, the President's role in 
preemption decisions would diminish, although he might be 
spurred to sponsor, influence, and veto proposed legislation in­
line with his preemption goals. The presumption against 
preemption would limit the benefits that come from a 
President's national perspective, but would protect states from 
unilateral decision-making.214 This is an argument in favor of the 
presumption against preemption that scholars have overlooked. 
By contrast, if the courts used administrative law to police 
agency factual and policy decisions, the President could maintain 
a central role in preemption, which has plusses and minuses 
depending on the model of presidential oversight. Courts would 
have to decide how presidential involvement impacts Chevron 
deference (for review of agency statutory interpretation) and 
hard look review (for review of agency policy decisions). On the 
one hand, presidential involvement might suggest greater 
211.  Sharkey, supra note 205, at 442. 
212. Metzger, supra note 180, at 2083. 
213. A third approach would put courts more solidly in the driver's seat in resolving 
federalism problems. Thomas Merrill advocates that courts should develop "a substantive 
conception of those areas of regulation in which uniform rules of federal law should 
prevail and those areas in which diverse state standards and approaches should be 
allowed to flourish." Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, 
Federalism Theory, and Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, 
NATIONAL INTERESTS, supra note 14, at 166-167. Thus, Merrill has attempted to develop 
a taxonomy of default rules that apply to different categories of cases when Congress is 
silent or ambiguous, based on experience with how "federalism values have played out in 
the past in particular areas." Id. at 169. This has been criticized as unrealistic as a 
"Herculean task" for the judiciary. Hills, supra note 138, at 6. 
214. The presumption against preemption (Congress must decide) bumps up against 
Chevron deference (defer to agency decisions), which is a tension the Supreme Court has 
not resolved. See Scott Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from Federal 
Administrative Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 76 (2008). 
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democratic accountability; on the other hand, it heightens the 
risk that an agency is acting for purely political motives. 
Professor Katherine Watts urges courts to openly acknowledge 
the politics inherent in agency decision-making, and to separate 
"pure partisanship or raw politics" from situations "where the 
political factors seek to implement policy considerations or value 
judgments tied in some sense to the statutory scheme being 
implemented."215 This line is blurry. However, charting it would 
allow courts to assess preemption without pretending that 
presidential politics are not part of the calculus, while 
simultaneously restricting overly political judgments. Even 
better, if the President enforced the federalism executive order 
through OIRA oversight, he would enhance the courts' ability to 
conduct preemption hard look review because rulemaking 
records would contain an agency's analysis of how federal 
regulations impact state law, the extent of consultation with state 
officials, and the benefits and costs of alternative strategies. 
Bringing presidential involvement into the sunshine would 
also enhance political accountability due to " [t]he Presidency's 
unitary power structure, its visibility, and its 'personality' [which] 
render the office peculiarly apt to exercise power in ways that 
the public can identify and evaluate. "216 Presidents can also offer 
a broader view than agencies see from their specialized perches. 
Further, if presidential preemption was pushed underground, an 
administration dedicated to secrecy could still exercise its 
political muscle behind closed doors. Agencies could act as 
fronts for White House decisions and be awarded Chevron 
deference for their stealth. So, if presidents are going to be 
involved in preemption, it should be transparent. Yet 
transparency alone is not enough. From a state perspective, too 
much presidential control could limit the benefits of regulatory 
expertise that agencies provide, raise concerns about presidential 
"capture" by powerful interest groups, and limit opportunities 
for state input because the President is far less accessible than 
agency staff or congresspersons. Accordingly, the challenge for 
the j udiciary is to harness the desirable aspects of presidential 
involvement in preemption decision-making, while restraining its 
abuses. 
215. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 56 (2009). 
216. Kagan, supra note 28, at 2332. 
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D. WHO DECIDES? 
As this Part demonstrates, each institutional actor has 
differing incentives and attributes when it comes to protecting 
federalism. Although there are many theoretical assumptions 
about which actor best preserves federalism, the reality is that all 
of them play a role in making federalism decisions. Ideally, 
Congress would make all preemption decisions; it is the 
institutional actor charged with lawmaking, and its processes are 
transparent and allow for public participation. However, the 
reality is that Congress does not, and sometimes cannot not, 
make ex ante preemption determinations. Thus, many 
preemption decisions get left to agencies under the President's 
supervision. Under the Bush Administration, the White House 
pushed a uniform policy of preemption and appears to have 
directed agencies to preempt state laws and regulations, even in 
situations where the outcome might otherwise have been 
different.211 The President's role in preemption has not been an 
issue in preemption litigation. However, courts might see two 
sides to presidential involvement. Presidential control over 
preemption can bring democratic accountability and better 
coordination to agency decisions. At the same time, presidential 
meddling might undermine the reasoned explanation that hard 
look review demands of agencies by substituting politics for 
reason. In the end, the type of presidential involvement is more 
important than the fact of his involvement. As the next Part 
argues, the Obama-managerial approach appears more likely to 
foster federalism than the Bush-unitary approach. 
III. THE PRESIDENT AND PREEMPTION 
Although all three branches of federal government have a 
role in maintaining federalism, the President has several unique 
attributes that could be harnessed to promote state autonomy. 
As overseer of the entire federal bureaucracy, he can coordinate 
programs across agencies, reduce overlap and waste, centralize 
review and oversight, and adapt quickly to changes in the 
regulatory landscape. Although presidential incentives vary, the 
President has the power to make federalism considerations a 
217. See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV'T REFORM, l lOTH CONG., 
FDA CAREER STAFF OBJECTED TO AGENCY PREEMPTION POLICIES ii (Comm. Print 
2008) ("At least one document suggests that the White House played a significant role in 
the preemption provisions and pressured the agency to reject the concerns of career 
experts."). 
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priority across the executive branch, if he so wishes. The 
question remains, however, as to how he should exercise his 
power to effect federal-state relations. Should the President be a 
d ' d ?2 18 ec1 er or a manager . 
This question gets to the controversy over directory 
authority, i .e . ,  whether the President has the power to direct 
agency outcomes, or whether his role involves management of 
the executive branch. Article II of the Constitution vests 
executive power in the President, but it only loosely describes 
the scope and extent of that power in the domestic sphere.2 19 It 
gives the President the authority to appoint "officers" of the 
United States and to "require the opinion, in writing" of those 
officers.220 Beyond those specifications, Article II commands the 
President to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed. "221 
The history surrounding the take care clause sheds little light on 
this language, probably because the Framers, themselves, 
disagreed over the proper scope of executive power.222 For its 
part, the . Supreme Court has given varying and irreconcilable 
support to both views of the Presidency, without resolving the 
issue, and, thus, directory authority remains an open question. 
Under President Bush, the White House directed specific 
outcomes in service of a pro-business agenda that advanced 
preemption across federal agencies. The strategy was effective 
and entirely consistent with the unitary executive theory that 
defined the Bush Presidency. By contrast, early indications are 
that President Obama is acting more as a manager, trying to 
enhance federal-state relations by making agencies do a better 
job of consulting and coordinating with the states. These are 
competing models of presidential administration with differing 
consequences for preemption. 
218. Cary Coglianese states that is a dichotomy without a difference, because "one 
person's 'oversight' will be another person's 'decision;"' moreover, the extent of 
presidential involvement is generally unknown to the public (or courts), and can always 
be covered by agency administrators. Cary Coglianese, Presidential Control of 
Administrative Agencies, A Debate Over Law or Politics?, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 637, 646 
(2010). 
219. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The executive power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America.") .  
220. Id. § 2. 
221. Id. § 3. 
222. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755 
(1996) (describing the narrative of the founding as revealing "at the most general level 
people groping . . .  toward a workable conception of government from which only broad 
purposes can safely be inferred."). 
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Under unitary executive theory, the President is at the apex 
of the executive branch; agency officials serve at his pleasure; 
and, thus, the President can direct how agencies exercise their 
delegated powers.223 As Professors Calabresi and Yoo explain, 
" [a ]11 subordinate nonlegislative and nonjudicial officials 
exercise executive power . . . only by implicit or explicit 
delegation from the president. "224 In this view, agencies are 
delegates of the President, rather than of Congress, "irrespective 
of Congress's  choice of delegate. "225 Unitarians point to the 
Framers' intent "to construct a unitary Executive since they felt 
it was conducive to energy, dispatch, and responsibility. "226 In 
light of the growth of the modern administrative state, the 
unitary executive fosters accountability and efficiency because 
only the President is situated to oversee the vast and complex 
federal bureaucracy.227 
In contrast, non-unitarians view agencies as the delegates of 
Congress, rather than instruments of the Executive. They take a 
different view of history, in which the Framers "believed that the 
President would be a managerial agent for the legislature rather 
than an independent source of domestic policy. "22 8  Further, 
concentration of power within the Executive runs counter to the 
Framers' goal of avoiding t�ranny by balancing and dispersing 
power among the branches.2 9 The Framers wanted to make "the 
machinery of government somewhat cumbersome, thus ensuring 
against the hegemony of one branch or person. "230 In the 
managerial view, accountability arises from multiple institutions 
223. See David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law 
in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1 107-08 (2008) 
(describing unitary executive theory and its relationship to the administrative state). 
224. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER s. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 4 (2008). 
225. Harold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B.U. L. REV. 523, 
525 (2008) (criticizing unitary executive theory). 
226. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 ,  639 (1994) . 
227. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 105-06 (1994) ; Kagan, supra note 28, at 2252. Cynthia Farina 
explains the appeal of unitary executive theory: it "responds powerfully to the 
uncertainty and overwhelming complexity of modern life." Cynthia Farina, False Comfort 
and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 372 (2010) . 
228. Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control 
of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193, 202-03 
(1981) .  
229. See Flaherty, supra note 222, at 1741. 
230. Abner Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 123, 177 (1994 ) . 
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and inputs, rather than from a unilateral actor, and the 
President's efficiency is best harnessed when he improves and 
refines regulatory processes. 
President Bush conducted his Presidency consistently with 
the unitary executive theory, and the preemption issue is only 
one of many examples of fidelity to that theory. Yet it is 
questionable whether the unitary executive furthered the values 
of accountability and efficiency when it comes to preemption. 
Unitary executive theorists argue that presidential decision­
making advances accountability because the President has a 
broad, national perspective, one not shared by bureaucrats who 
operate within the narrow zone of their expertise.23 1 Moreover, 
most bureaucrats are unelected and hidden from view, while the 
President is directly accountable to the entire electorate.232 Thus, 
the President is in the best position to consider how policy 
decisions will play out on a national stage. And, if citizens are 
unhappy with his decisions, they can punish or reward him at the 
ballot box. 
However, it is questionable whether the President is 
politically accountable for agency decisions because most 
governmental decisions are not on the radar screen of voters.233 
Moreover, it can be hard for voters to trace the source of 
administrative decision-making, particularly when the when the 
White House distances itself from bureaucrats' actions. Consider 
the preemption decisions of the Bush era. Due to a lack of 
transparency, the President was not publicly connected with the 
"preemption war."  Even though some of his political appointees 
were the public faces of preemption, it is unlikely that voters 
would punish the President at the ballot box for the complex 
controversies over FDA device labeling or CPSC mattress 
standards. As Heidi Kitrosser has pointed out, a unitary 
executive "lends itself to a President who can publicly distance 
himself from unpopular actions of the administrative state, but 
who has substantial power secretly to influence the same. " 234 
The most important factors for voters in the 2000 and 2004 
presidential elections were party affiliation, foreign policy, and 
231. See Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 
YALE L.J. 1395, 1405-06 (1 975) (noting that regulation often involves political choices, 
rather than solely technical decisions). 
232. See Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1742 
(2009) (summarizing unitary executive theory). 
233. See Farina, supra note 227, at 377-84 (explaining why the President does not 
represent voter preferences). 
234. Kitrosser, supra note 232, at 1765. 
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economic priorities.235 Even the most ardent supporters or 
vehement opponents of the President's  preemption policies ­
those who single-handedly voted on a state's  rights platform, 
alone-probably could not have impacted these elections. 
In pushing preemption, President Bush did not purport to 
mirror public preferences, but, rather, was advancing the 
interests of an important group of his constituents. Tort reform 
was an important goal to President Bush, who was supported by 
business throughout his campaigns and presidency, and who had 
a business background, himself. He believed that tort litigation 
was imposing undue costs on society, and that preemption was a 
way to rein in state tort lawsuits. Just as agencies are subj ect to 
interest group capture, the President is, as well. Here, the 
President did not act as a check on that capture, but, instead, 
reinforced it. Moreover, to the degree that state tort lawsuits and 
regulatory schemes serve as an independent check on agency 
capture, the President's  preemption policy removed that 
restraint, as well. Once the President made the preemption call, 
state opportunities for notice and comment before agencies and 
courts were meaningless. Indeed, in many instances, agencies 
preempted state law by preamble, thus stripping the public of 
notice and comment opportunities, altogether. The unitary 
executive thus can undermine accountability by "replac[ing] 
multiple identifiable avenues for public input and information 
access with a single, instrinsically opaque and relatively 
inaccessible formal decision maker. "236 
By contrast, President Obama's  preemption memorandum 
appears to be consistent with a managerial approach to the 
executive branch, in which accountability arises from transparent 
decision-making, policy dialogue and opportunities for input, 
and "flexibility in the value structure of bureaucratic decision­
making."237 Agency decision-making generally conforms to this 
vision of accountability because agencies study external scientific 
and technical research, conduct their own research, are subject 
to sunshine laws, provide public notice of their proposed 
decisions, accept public comment on proposed rules, hold 
stakeholder and regional meetings, and have regular direct 
235. See D. Sunshine Hillygus & Todd G. Shields, Moral Issues and Voter Decision­
Making in the 2004 Presidential Election, 38 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 201 ,  207 (2005) .  
236. Kitrosser, supra note 232, at 1743. 
237. PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: How EXECUTIVE POWER 
THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 166 (2009) .  
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interaction with the public.238 Agencies "gather more public input 
and receive more public scrutiny" than the President, and are 
also subject to judicial review.239 Despite these mechanisms, 
agencies have been insufficiently attentive to state interests and 
clearly need a push from an outside institutional actor. The 
President is ideally suited to give that push. 
In this regard, the efficiency and energy that attach to the 
Office of the President make him an ideal player for improving 
preemption decision-making. As unitary executive theorists 
point out, the President is uniquely situated to coordinate efforts 
across the federal bureaucracy.240 In The Federalist, Alexander 
Hamilton articulated this idea: "Energy in the executive is a 
leading character in the definition of good government. "241 A 
modern perspective links presidential control with "a number of 
so-called technocratic values: cost-effectiveness,  consistency, and 
rational priority-setting. "242 Thus, the notion of efficiency 
captures the benefits attached to a single, national leader ­
particularly as a way to counter the sprawl of the administrative 
state. 
President Bush's preemption policies were arguably 
"efficient" in that they were coordinated quickly across the 
federal bureaucracy. However, the Bush model of efficiency has 
its costs . The attribute of efficiency is particularly compelling in 
foreign affairs, where the United States needs to speak with a 
single voice, and in times of emergency, where executive delay 
can have tragic costs.243 However, these special circumstances do 
not arise in connection with most administrative decisions. 
Efficiency needs to be balanced with other constitutional values, 
such as democratic participation and non-arbitrariness. The 
managerial model accommodates these values by making 
agencies do a better job of carrying out statutory commands, 
while also giving states a voice in decisions that impact their 
regulatory prerogatives. 
238. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 201 ,  at 80-83. 
239. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 201 ,  at 83. 
240. See Calabresi, supra note 198, at 37-38. 
241 .  THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
242. Kagan, supra note 28, at 2339. 
243. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most 
Dangerous Branch From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2326 (2006) (noting the need for 
executive dispatch in certain circumstances, but warning that this "should not preclude ex 
post examination of executive conduct by agencies sharing jurisdiction"). 
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The managerial view animates the federalism executive 
orders and President Obama's  federalism memorandum. These 
presidential directives do not mandate any particular substantive 
outcome regarding preemption; rather, they are aimed at making 
agencies more attuned to state interests. They are intended to 
supervise, rather than supplant.244 A managerial approach is 
ideally suited for preemption issues because it encourages 
transparency and deliberation at the agency level. And the more 
a President becomes publicly linked with a commitment to 
federalism values, the more stakeholders can hold him 
accountable if agencies fail to live up to their end of the bargain. 
From the states' perspective, this managerial approach gives 
them opportunities to provide input to federal agencies, and to 
haggle and negotiate with agencies as part of the federal-state 
regulatory dance. 
Commentators have come up with ideas to strengthen 
federalism review even further. With the goal of promoting state 
level regulation to foster economic growth, John McGinness 
would limit federal regulation to situations when "interstate 
externalities or spillovers suggest that federal regulation is 
necessary," narrow the clear statement requirements to "those 
areas in which preemption would undercut jurisdictional 
competition," and provide judicial review to ensure that agencies 
comply with the executive order.245 
With the goal of protecting public health and safety, another 
group of scholars urge the President to revise the executive 
order to recognize that "federal and state governments play a 
cooperative role in setting public policy," rather than defining 
federalism as a limit on governmental power.246 They also 
recommend a presumption against ceiling preemption, a 
requirement that agencies differentiate between state common 
law and state positive law, and discouragement of implied 
preemption.247 To achieve these objectives, they suggest greater 
244. See Krent, supra note 225, at 547 (describing the managerial view in previous 
presidential administrations) . 
245. McGinnis, supra note 153, at 944; see also McGinnis, supra note 153, at 944-52 
(explaining how his account would limit federal regulation) . 
246. WILLIAM BUZBEE ET AL. , CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE 
TRUTH ABOUT TORTS: RETHINKING REGULATORY PREEMPTION AND ITS IMPACT 
ON PUBLIC HEALTH 15 (2009) , http://progressivereform.org/articles/ 
RethinkingPreemption902.pdf. 
247. Id. at 16-17. 
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scrutiny from OMB ; currently, agencies simply certify their 
compliance with the executive order.248 
These differing goals and suggestions reveal that even a 
managerial approach to executive branch administration can 
embody value judgments about federalism and the proper role 
of government, with substantive policy goals in mind. No form of 
executive administration can be value-neutral, and we do not 
expect our President to be impartial in executing the law. After 
all, he was elected for articulating and representing a particular 
agenda. Presidents are allowed to put their stamp on agency 
output as they "take care" to ensure that the "laws are faithfully 
executed. " Overseeing the executive branch, however, is 
different than deciding unilaterally how to apportion federal and 
state power. Both sets of federalism review suggestions above 
leave room for agency deliberation and state input, even if they 
are animated by differing obj ectives. Dialogue and debate about 
the proper scope of federalism are, themselves, part of the 
federal-state balance, and the President is an important figure in 
ensuring this debate continues. 
CONCLUSION 
During the Bush Administration, the White House 
orchestrated an effective tort reform strategy to protect industry 
by directing federal agencies to preempt state law in areas such 
as public health, consumer protection, and the environment. 
Preemption has advantages and disadvantages, usually 
depending on where one stands. For corporations, it lessens 
potential liability and provides uniform compliance standards. 
As a federalism matter, however, it diminishes the sovereignty of 
the states and limits their ability to act as policymakers. On an 
individual level, . it can strip injured citizens of the ability to seek 
compensation for negligent industry practices. 
A decision to preempt requires balancing a complex 
calculus of factors, including scrutiny of the statutory scheme at 
issue, the technical and/or scientific aspects of the regulatory 
program, the consequences for federalism, and the substantive 
goals of stakeholders. The Bush Administration "preemption 
war," however, appeared to short-circuit this analysis. Shortly 
after taking office, President Obama reversed course on 
preemption, instructing agencies to comply with Executive 
248. Id. at 18-20. 
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Order 13, 132, which requires agencies to respect the 
policymaking prerogatives of the states by limiting preemption, 
unless there is clear evidence that Congress intends to preempt 
state law. This does not mean that agencies will never preempt 
state law; rather, they must conduct a federalism analysis and 
seek feedback from the states in making preemption decisions. 
The contrast between the Bush and Obama Administrations 
with regard to preemption tracks two differing models of the 
Presidency. The Bush approach is modeled on unitary executive 
theory, in which the President is empowered to direct agencies 
to achieve the President's substantive goals. This approach can 
be efficient, but because it is unilateral, it cuts the states and 
other stakeholders out of the decision-making process. By 
contrast, President Obama is taking a managerial approach to 
agency oversight. He is steering the agencies to do a better j ob in 
considering federalism, but he is not overtly mandating any 
particular outcome. The managerial model respects agency 
expertise, allows for state input into the regulatory process, 
encourages deliberation, and provides greater transparency to 
the work of federal agencies. For these reasons, it provides more 
robust protection for federalism values than a unitary executive 
model. Time will tell whether these benefits of the managerial 
approach to preemption are realized, but it is a promising start. 
